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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Right to Counsel-Use of defendant's incrimi-
nating statements, surreptitiously procured by government agents
after indictment and in the absence of defendant's counsel, violates
defendant's constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amend-
ments.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84. Sup. Ct. 1199 (1964).
LastJune the United States Supreme Court decided to follow its cur-
rent trend toward a greater expansion of the sixth amendment guar-
antee of right to counsel, while declining to examine pressing prob-
lems of search and seizure. It is submitted that the Court would have
made a more significant contribution to the needs of the times by
a'ddressing itself to the real issue of search and seizure, rather than
to illusory and almost fictional questions of right to counsel.
Petitioner Massiah and one Colson were arrested for violation of
federal narcotics laws. Petitioner retained counsel and was arraigned,
indicted and released on bail. Colson, also released on bail, decided
to cooperate with the federal authorities 'in obtaining further evi-
dence and, accordingly, permitted a United States government agent
to install a radio transmitter in Colson's automobile. Petitioner,
ignorant of Colson's cooperation with the authorities and of the
presence of the transmitter, conversed with Colson in the latter's
automobile. The conversation was overheard by the federal agent
in a nearby car equipped with appropriate receiving apparatus. Dur-
ing the conversation petitioner made several incriminating state-
ments, which were introduced into evidence at his trial.'
Petitioner was convicted and appealed, alleging .that the evidence
in question was inadmissible because the government's use of the
radio equipment constituted an unreasonable search, in contraven-
tion of petitioner's rights under the fourth amendment, 2 and because
the method of obtaining the evidence constituted a denial of peti-
tioner's right to counsel, 3 and, therefore, a denial of due process. 4
1. The evidence was presented through the oral testimony of the eaves-
dropping government agent.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Id. amend. VI.
4. Id. amend. V.
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By a vote of two-to-one, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court de-
clined to rule on the allegation of unreasonable search, 6 but reversed
the judgment below on the grounds that the petitioner had been
denied right to counsel and due process of law:
All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating
statements, obtained by federal agents under the circum-
stances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used
by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial. 7
The Court, through Justice Stewart, cited Powell v. Alabama,8 where
the Court emphasized the importance of counsel during the "critical
period" between arraignment and trial.9 The Court relied heavily
on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Spano v. New York. 1 0
There the defendant, under indictment for murder, was subjected to
prolonged nocturnal interrogation in the police station, culminating
in defendant's confession. The rule in Spano, enunciated by Chief
Justice Warren, was that the absence of counsel, under the circum-
stances,' rendered the confession involuntary and, therefore, inad-
missible. Stewart, concurring, argued that ". . . the absence of coun-
sel when this confession was elicited was alone enough to render it
inadmissible .... 1 2 The Court in Massiah noted that this concurring
opinion in Spano has become the rule in New York. 1 3 The Court
reasoned that an accused's right to counsel, if it is to be meaningful
must apply to surreptitious, as well as open, interrogation by the
prosecution. Justice White, joined in dissent by Justices Clark and
Harlan, argued for the retention of the voluntary-involuntary stand-
ardt 4 in determining the constitutionality of incriminating state-
ments.
5. Massiah v. United States, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962).
6. "Because of the way we dispose of the case, we do not reach the fourth
amendment issue." Massiah v. United States, 84 Sup. Ct. 1199, 1201, 1202.
7. Massiah v. United States, stpra note 6 at 1203.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Counsel for the defendants in Powell was not appointed until the day of
the trial. The Court subsequently applied the "critical period" standard so as to
require counsel at an arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) and
at a preliminary hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
10. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
11. The defendant was foreign-born, had but a junior high school education,
a history of mental and emotional disturbances, and no previous criminal record.
12. Spano v. New York, supra note 10 at 326.
13. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 175 N.E.2d 445
(1961).
14. See Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958). But see Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964).
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In deciding Massiah as it did, the Court is following its now-estab-
lished trend toward a wider application of the constitutional guaran-
tee of right to counsel.' 1 However laudable this trend may be, and
however valid the Massiah rule may be as an abstract principle of
constitutional law, the rule fails to come to grips with the actual
problem presented by the facts. The real injury to Massiah was
caused by the presence of the transmitter, not by the absence of
Massiah's attorney. The presence of counsel could not have bettered
Massiah's position vis-a-vis the eavesdropping authorities. Therefore,
the basic question is, or should be, whether or not the activities of the
authorities amounted to an unreasonable search. The present rule is
that a search is not unreasonable unless it involves a physical tres,
pass.' 0 Thus a holding that Massiah was the victim of an unrea-
sonable search would have necessitated a change in the current rule.
Years ago direct and overt physical intrusion upon one's person or
premises was the only possible means of invading the right to privacy.
It is significant that the trespass standard was enunciated at a time
when radios were not in widespread use, transistorized devices were
unknown, and highly sensitive and easily-concealable transmitting,
recording and receiving apparatus had not yet been developed. In
short, the trespass standard was at one time a workable criterion.
But new scientific methods of evidence procurement present con-
comitant threats to the right of privacy.' 7 In the words of Justice
Brandeis:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the Government. Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to
obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the
closet. 18
Through an ingeniously contrived rationale, the Court in Massiah
surrendered to the "last temptation ... to do the right deed for the
wrong reason."'1 9
ROBERT S. BARKER
15. Hamilton v. Alabama, supra note 9, White v. Maryland, supra note
9, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Escobedo v. Illinois supra note 14.
16. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), United States v. Kabot,
295 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 803 (1962). See also Davis, Federal
Searches and Seizures, § 9.16 (1964).
17. See dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and On
Lee v. United States, supra note 16.
18. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 17 at 473.
19. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, part 2.
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